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SUMMARY	 I
This report discusses the use of failure flow anal-
ysis to evaluate the test program of the Interplanetary
Monitoring Platform I (IMP-I) spacecraft. The flow
of defects from point of origin to point of detection is
mapped. The effectiveness of the various screen sys-
tems is calculated, anc: the reasons for escape from
the screens is presented. Tl_e distribution of causes
of defects is examined, and the criticality of the de-
fects is determined. The flight results are compared
to the test performance.
The bench test screen and subsystem test screen
are both only about 50% effective, while the system test
is 92% effective. Design is a major cause of defects,
but the number of parts defects - in test and in space -
is significant. About half of the defects detected in
test would have resulted in a much degraded sub-
system performance if they occurred in space, but
few defects would have affected the entire mission. The
flight results seem to show the ability of a protoflight
test program to detcct fabrication caused defects.
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AN APPLICATION OF FAILURE FLOW
ANALYSIS TO A GSFC SPACECRAFT PROJFCT
INTRODUCTION
Failure flow analysis was developed by the General Electric Company and
was applied to the RAE-A system test program in 1969 through a contract moni-
tored by the Past Experience and Performance Program of the Test and Evalua-
tion Division (ref. 1). This method of analyzing a test program showed promise
for analyzing other GSFC test programs so a decision was made to do a failure
flow analysis as an in-house effort.
Description of Failure Flow Analysis
Failure flow analysis depends on an accurate malfunction reporting system
as its major source of data. The data is analyzed to provide information on such
things as the criticality of defects, where the defect originated, what the cause
of the defect was, why the defect escaped certain test screens, and others. In
this way the defect can be tracked through a program from source to detection
and diversion, and hence, the analogy with defects flowing through a system of
screens.
There are two major facets to failure flow analysis. First, it critically ex-
amines a test program and indicates which areas need improving. Second, it
points out the sources of defects, which could lead to the elimination of some
sources and the diminution of others.
The Use of IMP-I for This Study
IbIP-I was chosen as the program for the application of failure flow analysis.
Although this study was undertaken primarily to evaluate the practicability of
using failure flow analysis on a large scale basis, the BIP-I test program pro-
vided an opportunity to collect some data that would be useful regardless of fail-
ure flow analysis. More detailed reasons why IMP-I was used are provided in
the next three paragraphs.
1. IMP-I was an in-house program. This meant that most of the testing
was done at GSFC, and individual tests could be observed if desired.
Also, many of the designers and fabricators of the hardware were
available when questions arose on the nature or consequences of a
particular malfunction.
2. TMP-T had an extensive and well documented subsystem test program.
Past examinations of system test programs have been hampered by a
lack of information on performance prior to systein testing.
3. IMP-I %vas a protoflight spacecraft. Since the protoflight concept is be-
coming popular, and IMP-I was the most complicated protnflight space-
craft ever built at GSFC, then the IMP-I test program could provide
valuable information on the strengths and weaknesses of the protoflight
concert.
Definition of Terms
fhere are a number of terms that are used in failure flow analysis that need
to be defined here.
1. Definition of Defect - the term defect encompasses the standard connotation
of manufacturing flaws, but also includes any imperfection in the speci-
fications, drawings, software, or hardware in a spacecraft program. In
this report, two types of defects - systematic and non-systematic - are
considered. Defects which can occur with regularity on all production
units are described as "systematic. " Defects which occur only by
chance on isolated production units are described as "non-systematic.
2. Definition of Malfunction - defects are visible only when they manifest
themselves through the occurrence of an anomalous condition in the
program. Such anomalous conditions are normally termed "malfunc--
tion. " Such terms as failure, anomaly, and problem are all included
in "malfunction. "
3. Definition of Protection - as used in failure flow analysis, protection
is any hardware or procedure that is used to overcome the effects of a
malfunction. For example, redundancy is a common type of hardware
protection, and the ability to override an automatic operation with a
ground command is a type of procedural protection.
4. Definition of Criticality - the "criticality" of a defect is determined
from the effect a malfunction would have on the operation of tae sub-
system, and also the effect of the malfunctioning subsystem on the mis-
sion objectives. This report considers four levels of criticality -
catastrophic, major degrading, minor degrading, ant negligible. When
the effects of protection, such as redundancy, are included, there are
four ways of looking at the criticality of each defect: (1) subsystem
before protection; (2) subsystem after protection; (3) mission before
protection; and (4) mission after protection.
2
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5. Definition of Screen - a screen is any activity whose purpose is the de-
tection and diversion of defects. Detection is the acknowledgement that
a defect exists and the identification of the defect. Diversion is the re-
moval of the defect from the system. Defects may escape a scree.i,
and thus remain in the program (or in the flow), by either escaping de-
tection or by escaping diversion.
6. Definition of Card - a card is the smallest assembly of a subsystem or
experiment. It is usually a trapezoidally shaped metal box that contains
numerous piece parts, has its own connectors, and is potted as a unit.
Some experiments containPa ^nly one card, while others used three or
more. During bench test and subsystem test each card in ar, experi-
ment or subsystemn was often tested separately, rather than the whole
subsystem or experiment.
7. Definition of Ineligible - a defect is ineligible for detection by a screen
when the defect is of such a nature that the screen would not normally
be expected to detect the defect (e.g. , a defect that could only be found
in thermal-vacuum would not be eligible for the vibration test screen).
Ineligibility also ap plied to defects that were not in the flow yet, v, ere
not presented to the screen, were time dependent failure processes,
were due to some variability in the hardware, or were not presented to
the screen at a high enough level of assembly. (An example of a time
dependent defect would be a void that requires a month to outgas to the
point where the pressure is in the critical region for voltage breakdown.
This would be ineligible for the Lnermal-vacuum test screen, since the
test only lasts two weeks. )
8. Definition of Inadequate - a screen is inadequate if it d',es not detect a
defect that it should detect:
Structure of Failure Flow Analysis
Failure flow analysis divides the test program into a series of screens. The
defects are represented as "flowing" through the screen systern. -xith each screen
acting like a sieve for particular kinds of defects. In the analysis each screen
is considered separately, and then groups of screens are consid-cred as an
aggregate.
The screen system for INIP-I is presented in figure 1. Thus screen system
is shown divided into four separate groups - bench test, subsystem test, system
test, and orbit. Individual screens in each group were examined, anci then each
group was considered as an aggregate. The next section of this report will deal
with the bench test screen, and succeeding sections will l,c concerned with suh-
system test screens, system test screens, space performance, and con:.lusions.
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Figure 1 . IMP-i Screen System
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ISFNCH TEST SCREEN
pest^ri nt i r,ll 4 the Bench Test Screen
The bench test screen is shown in Figure 2. Any testing that is done sub-
sequent to fabrication but prior to formal environmental test is included in tills
8.
`i	 ILLSi
l ^t i ^
103
Figure 2. 8e„c^ Test Screen M
screen. This is the screen where the initial problems are worked out of the
hardware. It could include anything frurn ambient testing to testing in -a design-
er's own temperature or thermal-vacuum chamber. These tests can be thought
of a; develonrnantal tF.qts. For this reason . many defE-C:t.ti found at til ti ^tn^rs
are not reported as malfunctions, although a few are reported, so that- t'.:e cX
tent of activity during the bench test screen is only partially Lmown.
	 ie amuun
of testing done during this screen clepends on the practice of each iuuivi(twil
designer. The significance of the numbers is fr iven below under Performance. .
Qiie roan	 considering  t e bent} teat ac a scrn i}-ot ^ t --- of	 ^
-	 - -- 
n for . ee h	
-	 - -	 -
s f
- -
	 T`--^--- = ^ -	 iiidefects that are detected by a screen further downstream in the test program
could have been found by the bench test scrcen. In faiiure flow terminology,
bench test is the most eligible screen for a number of defects fund later in the AM
test program. if the reasons for escape from the bench test screen can be de-
	
in
terrained, then the bench teat St.icen could pvSaiuiy be made i5'• iire eI1Ct;Llve,
and the londinlr on the s rrecns f:zrthcr uUYYnstY- lam could	 rcduced.
WE
Performance of the Bench Test Screens
	
r	 ^
Every defect, witil the exception of those generated during the test program.
l.ad to p f _= thrmi p-h the hPneh test screen. Of the 125 malfunctions reported ir.
malfunetinn reports throughout the program, 17 were detected and diverted dur-
ing l)enca test. as was mentfened earlier, however, not all malfunctions occurring
	
s	 5
jr ^^	 -
during bench test are reported. The difference between the 125 malfunction re-
ports and the 103 defects entering bench test is that 22 defects did not go through
the bench test screen.
Reasons for Escape from Bench Test Screen
The reasons for escape from the bench test screen are given in Figure 3. The
largest percentage is shown to be in the "not practical" category. H'i-)re 4
combines the various categories of Figure 3 into three basic categories. The
first category includes those that were not likely to lie found during bench test.
The bench test screen is ineligible to detect these defects. The Second catebn ^r
includes those defects that should have beer. detcctcd but were not. These are
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Bench Test Screen
a
the true escapes, and generally speaking the screen was inadequate to detect
them. The third category includes the defects that wcrp detected and diverted.
Figure 4 shows the bench test screen to be less than 50% effective. A screen
effectiveness is calculated by dividing the number of defects eligible for detec-
tion in a screen into the number of defects that actu.a lly were detected. Because
of the number e lf malfunctions that were unre ported. not much confidence can be
placed in the calculated effectiveness of the bench test screen.
C'.ri_ticalit • of neFe^ts Found = 'Bench Test Screenr ^?d	 lu 111 
As mentioned previously, there are four criticality categories. Categofy 1,
catastrophle is a 30 perue_ . rm to 10"" vurcL_­­' l oss A operation. C,atego .I LV 2,
1110. or UCprGLlllll` 1 3	 tO 3 V AJr1l.+G11t lt}JJ of VpGr61.1011. Vet 1.CgV1 Y alb
minor degrading, is a 10 percent to 50 percent loss of operation. Category 4,
negiigibie, is a. less than 10 percent loss of operation. 'fable 1 shows the sub-
system and mission criticalities before and after protection of the defects de-
tected in the bench test screen. T`he numbers in the table are numbers of
defects.
I
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Table 1
Bench Test Screen: Criticality vs Protection
Criticality
1 ^ ^2 ^ s ^ 4
Subsystem Before Protection 12 3 1 1
Subsystem After Protection I	 10 3 1 3
Mission Before Protection	 2	 2	 1	 12
i
^	 Mission After Protection	 2 1	 I	 1	 13
Note 1: Criticality
	
9047/*0 - 1007' loss	 3 10%- 50% loss
	
2 SU"7o - 4C- loss
	
4	 017c. - 10% loss
Nice 2: Numbers in table are nuitiber of defects.
1'ir'%iv(; of Lilt: seventeen dcfecis were ca%dstrc Yl^.. LV L11L oubsy oLCllt VG1V1G
trl llLCLLl:.lrt, and protection does very little to reduce the criticality. On the other
hand only about one-eighth of the defects are catastrophic to the mission, but,
again, t ;ere is practically no protection. If these patterns were to persist through-
out the screen system, then a space malfunction would probably lead to the loss
of a subsystem. If a malfunction occurred in a mission critical item, the prob-
ability would be that the mission would be lost. Consideration of the major de-
grading (criticality 2) defects does not improve this picture.
Criticality versus Probability of Space Malfunction
When the causes of the defects are considered, some of the defects will be
shown to have been caused by some faulty test or checkout activity. These de-
fects are classified as generated defects. There is also the possibility in any
test program that some malfunctions will occur in test that would not necessarily
occur in space. Because of these situations, each defect has been examined for
its probability of causing a malfunction in space. Figure 5 presents the results
of this examination. As can be seen, 71 percent of all the defects found in the
bench test screen had a high probability of causing n malfunction in space. This
information alone, is not enough to describe the situation, however. Another im-
portant piece of information is how the must critical defects are distributed
with respect to the probability of causing a space malfunction. If the catastrophic
defects had 1..••a low :;i'vuabilttY of causing a space malfunction, then the alarm
8
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Figure 5. Probability that Defects Found in Bench Test Screen
Would Have Caused a Malfunction in Space
caused by having a large percentage of catastrophic defects can be relieved.
Table 2 shows, though, that this is not the case, since 85 percent of the cata-
strophic and major degrading defects (to subsystems before protection) had a
hijzh probability of causing a space malfunction.
Table 2
Probability of Flight Malfunction vs Criticality of the Malfunctions
Found it Bench Test Screen (.Numbers in table are numbers of defects)
1
2
v
3
J
4
0-20	 20-80	 80-100
Probability (%) of a Flight
Malfunction
Criticality versus the Systematic Nature of Defects
In a program where several "identical" pieces of hardware are going to be
made, the determination of the systematic nature of the defects can be of some
1 - 90% - 100%
Criticality in	 2 - 50%n - 90%
percent loss of
function	 3 - 10% - 50 %n
4-0% - 10%
9
1- 90`10- 100%1
2
3
4
Criticality in percent
loss of function
r-
2 8
1 2
2 0
2 0
2 - 50°,'x- 90';0
3 - 10% - 5 o7o
4 - 0(7b - 10510
- --- -	 —	 -	 ^--tea
benefit. Non-systematic defects usually affect only one piece of hardware,
whereas syst ^matin defects affect more than one piece of hardware. Therefore,
the distribution between systematic and non-systematic defects can indicate the
extent of the effort needed to correct the defects. Generally, systematic defects
would take more time, effort, and money to correct than would non-systematic
defects. 'rhe criticality of the systematic and of the no1 .-systematic defects is
given in Table 3. Given this type of information, and time and dollar constraints,
a project manager has an overview of how critical the defects are, and how many
defects could be allowed to fly without repair if neecssar ,y. In the case of IMP-T,
all the non-systematic defects are at least major degrading, but the systematic
defects are uniformly distributed from negligible to catastrophic. At this stage
of the test program, the bench test screen, this type of information is not as
important as it would be later in the program .
Table 3
Systematic Nature of Defects vs Criticality of Defects
Found in Bench Test Screen
U	 U
Q	
O Q)
4.4	 4Jz
Causes of Defects
The causes of the defects detected in the bench test screen are shown in
Table 4. The causes are presented in five general categories: design, fabrication/
assembly, parts/materials, operator error; CSE/ A., and! ing,  and miscellaneous.
During the analysis, each of these categories has a number of sub-categories.
For example, design has a packaging and mounting sub-category. Thus, if any
one sub-category begins to accumulate a large number of defects then this par-
ticular cause could be. flagged as a matter for attention. 1"he large percentage
of design defects shown in Table 4 is not surprising for the bench test screen
since this screen is used to debug the hardware What in somewhat surprising
is the 12 percent due to parts /materials. This seem s to be a high percentage,
but there are no data from other spacecraft at this level of test which would in-
dicate the "normal" number of parts /materials defects.
10
Table 4
Cau.,es of Defects .Found in Bench Test Screen
Design
Fabrication/Assembly
41 o^
29%
Pai-ts /Materials 120
Operator/GSE/llandling 12%
Miscellaneous 610
SUBSYSTEM TEST SCREENS
This section of the report will failure flow analyze each of the subsystem
test screens individually and also analyze the aggregate of the three screens as
an overall subsystem test screen.
Description of Subsystem Test Screens
The subsystem test screens are shown in Figure 6. These are seen to be
three individual screens: magnetic/EMI, vibration, and thermal -vacuum.
l THERMAL-VACUUM
VIBRATION
—tEMI/MAGNETIC
I
Figure 6. Subsystem Test Screens
1. The magnetic/EMI test screen is a combination of two tests — magnetic
and electromagnette interference. These are different from the other
11
Performance of Subsystem Test Screens in Failure Flow Format
s
environmental screens in that the subsystem must meet certain magnetic
and radiation specifications rather than survive a particular environmen-
tal stress. These tests were run according to the IMP-I test specifica-
tion for suhsystems (ref. 2).
2. Cards were subjected to vibration according to the IMP-I specification
for subsystems (ref. 2).
3. Cards were subjected to thermal-vactcam according to she IMP-I speci-
fication for subsystems (ret. 2).
Performance of the Subsystem Test Screen
Figure 7 presents the performance of each subsystem test screen in failure
flow format. The bubble below each screen shows the number of defects in the
52
8	 THERMAL-VACUUM 1
	 1	 28 ) 1	 26
flow entering that screen. A bubble to the left of a screen gives the number of
defects, not previously in the flow, that enter the flow at that screen. Thus,
the total number of defects presented to a screen is the sum of the lower bubbl-
and the left bubble.
'he bubble to the right of a screen indicates the number of detections in that
screen, while the dotted bubble indicates the number of additional times defects
were detected at the screen before they were diverted. The rectangle to the
right of each screen shows the number of diversions made at the screen.
As can be seen in Figure 7, 86 defects were in the flow from the bench test.
screen, nine defects entered the flow during subsystem test, 43 defects were
diverted, so 52 defects remained in the flow to the system test screen.
Some special attention should be given to the Magnetic/EMI screen which
shows only one detection and diversion. As stated earlier, magnetic and EMI
tests are used to determine if the magnetic and radiative properties are within
specified limits. Consequently, there are almost never any functional failures
during these tests, and therefore, no malfunction reports. The fact that there
were no malfunction reports does not mean that there were no problems or out
of specification tests. Figure 8 gives the results of the magnetic and EMI tests.
Number of Tests
	
Number Unsatisfactory	 Percent Unsatisfactory
Magnetic 114 17 15%
EMI 94 32 33%
Figure 8. Results of Subsystem EMI and Magnetic Tests
Compared with IMP-F, which was also a protoflight spacecraft, IMP•-I had about
6 percent fewer unsatisfactory magnetic tests. This difference does not seem
to be significant, so that with respect to magnetic tests IMP-I is about normal.
There is no significant amount of data with which to compare the EMI test
results.
Reasons for Escape from Subsystem Test Screens
The reasons for escape from each subsystem test screen are given in Fib-
ures 9, 10, and 11. Figure 9 concerns only the magnetic/EMI screen, Figure
10 only the vibration screen, and Figure 11 only the thermal-vacuum screen.
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Figure 9. Diversions and Reasons for Fscape from EMI
Magnetic Subsystem Test Screen
The vast majority, 87 percent, of the escapes from the magnetic/EMI subsys-
tem test screen are shown to be in the ineligible category. *
Figure 10 shows that ineligibility is the primary reason for escape from the
vibration test screen. This figure indirectly shows that the subsystem vibration
test effectiveness is 47 percent, which is not much different from the bench test
effectiveness of 50 percent.
Figure 11 shows that more defects are eligible for the thermal-vacuum sub-
system test screen than for any other subsystem test screen. one reason for
this is that the thermal-vauum test provides time for a. detailed functional check,
whereas ma.gnetie/EMI and vibration are usually followed by cursory functional
tests. Since more defects are eligible for this screen, more defects are de-
tected and diverted in the thermal-vacuun, screen than the others, but the test
effectiveness is 52 percent.
*II the test effectiveness for this screen is based on the defects reported in the malfunction reports, then the
effectiveness is only seven percent. However, an examination of the reported defects reveals that each was
an electromagnetic interference type of defect. With this information the data presented in Figure 8 can
be used to calculate an effectiveness of 77 percent. This 77 percent effectiveness is probably more repre-
sentative of the magnetic/EMI screen than the seven percent.
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Diversions and Reasons for Escape from Vibration
Subsystem Test $t. :en
The fact that the bench test screen, the vibration test screen and the thermal-
vacuum test screen each have a test effectiveness around 50 percent suggests
that a 50 percent test effectiveness may be a characteristic test effectiveness
for subsystem tests. Since this result is based on IMP -I data only, subsystem
test results from other protoflight programs are needed to substantiate the con-
clusion. The test effectiveness for the magnetic jEi4II screen has been ignored
while reaching this result because of the different way it is calculated.
Considering the aggregate of the subsystem test screens, the reasons for
escape are presented in Figure 12. As would be expected, the dominant reason
is ineligibility. The overall subsystem test screen effectiveness is 46 percent.
A more detailed examination of these defects that were ineligible for detec-
tion at the subystem level yields some interesting information. Sixty percent
of the defect's ineligible for detection at the subsystem level were ineligible be-
cause they required a higher level of assembly for detection. Put another way,
:0 percent of all the defects that escaped detection during subsystem test es-
caped because the system level of assembly was necessary to detect them.
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Criticality of Defects Detected in Subsystem Test Screens
The one defect detected in the magnetic/EMI screen was catastrophic to the
subsystem before and after protection, but had a negligihle effect on the mis-
sion before and after protection.
The criticality of defects found in the subsystem vibration test is presented
in Table 5. There are more defects in the negligible and minor degrading to
Table 5
Vibration Test Screen: Criticality vs Protection
(Numbers in table are number of defects)
Criticality I	 1 2 3 4
Subsystem Before Protection
	
1	 3 2 3 8
Subsystem After Protection 3 2 3 8
Mission Before Protection 0 0 2 14
Mission After Protection 0 0 2 14
subsystem categories than in the major degrading and catastrophic categories.
The defects detected in vibration would have had negligible effect on the mission.
Protection had no effect on the defects detected iii vibration.
The criticality of the defects detected in the subsystem thermal-vacuum
test is shown in Table F. Again there are a few more defects in the minor
Table 6
Tharmnl-Vnnnum Crrpan• Criticality vs Prntertinn
,ry
i
Icriticality to subsystem categories than in the major criticality categories.
Every defect was in the negligible to mission category-. Protection reduces the
criticality to subsystem for oidy twu to Liie eight catastrophic defects, and has
no effect on any other defects.
Tabie 7 presents the criticality analysis
 
p  for the overall subsystem test
screen. The same comments can be made about the aggregate as were made
_ Table 7
Subsystem Test Screen: Criticality vs Protection
(Numbers in table are number of defects)
Criticality	 I 1 I	 2	 I 3 4
Subsystem Before Protection 12 5 8 18
Subsystem After Protection 10 5 8 I	 20
Imssion Before Protection u 0 2 41
rission After Protection 0 0 2	 41
about the individual screens. An interesting observation is the comparison be-
tween the criticality of Uie defects found in the bench test screen and the criti-
cality of the defect: found in the subsystem test screen. Most of the defects
found in the bench test were in the catastrophic to subsystem category, but foi-
the subsystem screen there were more defects in the minor criticality categor-
ies than the major.
In both the bench test screen and the subsystem test screen the criticality
of defects is affected very little by protection.
Criticality versus Probability of Space Malfunction
Table 8 presents the distribution of defects detected in the subsystem tests
acrnrfling to their probability of causing a space malfunction. As can be seen,
most of the defects would have resulted in a flight malfunction if they had not
been diverted during the test program.
The distribution of defects according to criticality and probability of causing
a space malfunction is shown in Table 9. Note that all of the catastrophic and
major degrading defects had a high probability of causing a problem in space.
i ^^
Table 8
Probability that Defects Found in Subsystem Test Screens
Would Have Caused a Malfunction in Space
(Numbers in table are ua^-Iber of defects)
Vibration
Thermal-Vacuum
Total Subsystem
1 4 I	 11
F 8 4 i4
9 8 26
J
0-20	 20-80	 80-100
Probability (%) of a Flight Malfunction
Table 9
Probability of Flight Malfunction vs Criticality of the Malfunctions
Found in Vibration Subsystem Test Screen
(Numbers in table are numbers of defects)
1
4
2
U
3
4
0-20
	
20-80	 80-100
Probability (rnc) of a Flight Malfunction
Table 10 gives the same data for the subsystem thermal-vacuum test. Al-
though most of the catast rolph ic ­d major debrading defects were likely to have
caused a space malfunction, there were a few that were det eted during test
that had a low probability of causin g a space malfunction.
The data for the overall subsystem test sercen is shown in Table H. These
data all indicate that the defects datected during subsystem test were "real" de-
fects that would have caused malf^.inctions later, and did not result from the
amount or severity of testing.
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Table 10
Probability of Flight Malfunci.ioiL vs Criticality of the Malfunctions
Found in Thermal-Vacuum Subsystem Test Screen
(Numbers in table are number of defects)
-20
	 20-80	 80-100
Probability (`7c) of a Flight Malfunction
Table 11
Probability of Flight Malfunction vs Criticality of the Malfunctions
Found in the Subsystem Test Screens
(Numbers in table are number of defects)
t	 •^
1
C `U
3
U
4
2 2 8
1 1 3
2 _- 5
4 4 10
0-20	 20-80	 80-100
Probability (%) of a Flight Malfunction
Criticality versas the Systematic Nature of Defects
The systematic nature of defects detected in the subsystem test screens is
	 i
presented in Figure 13. As was the case for the bench test screen, there are
more non-systematic than systematic defects. The distribution between system-
atic and non-systematic defects is shown to be approximately the same for both
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Figure 13. Breakdown of Systematic and Non- Systematic
Defects Found in the Subsystem Test Screens
the vibration test and the thermal-vacuum test. Table 12 gives the distribution
of systematic and non-systematic defects detected during subsystem test according
Table 12
Syaternatic Nature of Defects vs Criticality of Defects Found in
Subsystem Test Screen (Numbers in table are number of defects)
5 7
1 4
3 5
L	 7 11
1
2
U
ti 3U
4
Svstema.tic	 Non-Svgtematic
to criticality. The systematic defects are distributed according to criticality
in about the same way as the systematic defects detected in the bench test
screen. There were proportionally fewer major criticality non-systematic de-
fects during sysbystem test than during bench test.
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IAn interesting sideli ght here is the determination of the screen effectiveness
for systematic defects only. These data are presented in Table 13. Because the
screen effectiveness for all defects is 46 percent, the subsystem test screens
are 10 to 15 percent more effective for systematic defects.
Tablc 13
Subsystem Test Screen Effectiveness for
Systematic DefecLb
Possible to
Detect
Detected &
Diverted Effectiveness
Vibration 27 16 60%
Thermal-Vacuum 4 26 60%
Overall 77 43 56%n
Causes of Defects
The causes of the defects found in the subsystem vibration test screen are
presented in Figure 14. There are two significant differences between the
causes of the defects detected in vibration and those detected in bench test.
First, the relative percentages for design and for fabrication are switched from
the bench test results. This is not surprising, as the vibration test is usually
a good screen for workmanship type defects. Second, the percentage of parts/
materials defects has doubled. There does not seem to be an immediate ex-
planation for this.
Figure 15 presents the same type of data for the thermal-vacuum test
screen. Again, there are more fabrication caused defects than design defects,
but the number of part/materials defects is the same as in bench test.
Figure 16 gives the cause data for the aggregate subsystem test screen.
There is a higher percentage of fabrication defects than design defects, which is
different from bench test, and the percentage of parts/materials problems is
slightly higher tLan for bench test.
Environmental SenEitivity of Defects
Figure 17 depicts the perceni of the defects detected in each environ-
ment that were determined to have been sensitive to that environment.
Nearly all of the defects detected in vibration and EMI tests were sensitive to
j•'1.
22
100
80
F--
Z 60
LL I AO0- ry
20
0 V) V)
	Z 	 0LU
	
0	 z
jZ
O	 U
	
re	 0V)	 cc	 VII
	
WOc
<	 ex	 —0	 U-	 Uj
Figure 14. Causes of Defects Found in Vibration Subsystem Test Screen
'90
80
7 00
LU
U
w 40U.j
CL
20
0
V)
Ln
	Z
	
0
LU	 U.)
Z
<__j
•
	
U	 Oe	 w0
	
Q:f	 0V)	 CO	 Ce	 w	 V)
	
w <	 <	 Ce0	 U-	 n	 LLJ
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the particular environment, but less than half of the defects found in thermal-
vacuum were sensitive to that environment. There are t:vo possible explanations
for this. first, the malfunction may have been caused by vibration, but not
de*ecteu until thermal-vacuum. This is a possibility because of the lack of a
comprehensive functional check between vibratlon test and thermal-vacuum.
Second, the defects could have been eligible for, and escaped the bench test.
SYSTEM TEST SCREENS
Description of System Test Screens
The system test screens are shown in Figure 18. System tests include all
tests performed on the integrated or partially integrated spacecraft, including
the environomental tests according to the IMP-I specifications, (ref. 3 and
ref. 4). There are 17 system test screens: (1) integration; (2) sun spin/
magnetic: (3) EMI; (4) temperature; (5) mass properties; (6) ACS deployment;
(7) reintegration; (8) vibration/shock; (9) spin deployment; (10) reintegration/
EMI: (11) thermal-vacuum; (12) solar simulation setup/SES failure/solar
simulation; (13) short vacuum tests one and two; (14) short thermal-vacuum:
(15) reintegration; (16) vibration; (17) final and ETR checkout.
1. The integration screen includes all the integration and test activities of
spacecraft up to May 25, 1970. This is the period when the spacecraft
was put together for the first time, and a functional checkout of the en-
tire spacecraft system could be accomplished.
2. The sun spin/magnetic screen is a combination of two tests. The sun
spin test checked out the optical aspect system. The magnetic test de-
termined the magnetic properties of the spacecraft. This screen covers
the period from May 25, 1970 to May 26, 1970.
3. This screen is the EMI test of the entire spacecraft. It covers the
period from June 4, 1970 to June 11 , 1970.
4. The temperature test screen is the week long temperature only test of
the spacecraft. It covers the period from June 12, 1970 to June 19,
1970.
Includedas•l__	 t_ _a6CO screen, i_ 5. The mass properties screen is [ 1vi, raatiy a	 6iic6  butuu^
as a screen because the measurement of the mass properties occurred
during the test program. Such properties as weight, center of gravity,
and balance are measured, and these measurements are the reference
measurements until launch. This screen covers the period from July 28,
1970 to August 5, 1970.
I
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6. The attitude control system (ACS) deployment test was done between
August 6, 1970 and August 18, 1970. This test checked the deployment
of the ACS booms.
7. Between August 19, 1970 and September 24, 1970 the spacecraft was
partially disassembled and then reassembled. This period of activity
is the reintegration test screen.
8. The vibration and shock tests were run between September 25, 1970  and
September 30, 1970. The spacecraft received three axis sine and ran-
dom vibration at protoflight levels according to the IMP-I specification,
and a pyrotechnic shock test.
9. A series of spin deployment tests were run between October 2, 1970
and October 20, 1970. This screen was to test the various boom de-
ployment mechanisms under conditions of underspin and overspin as
well as normal spin. The tests were performed in the dynamic test
chamber (DTC).
10. The period from October 21, 1970 to October 31, 1970 was another re-
integration period. An EMI test was performed, and the spacecraft was
setup for the thermal-vacuum test.
11. The thermal-vacuum test was performed between November 2, 1970
and NovembeL 14, 1970. Protoflight levels were used according to the
IMP-I test specification.
12. The period of November 14, 1970 to December 20, 1970 has three parts
that make up this screen. The first part is the preparation of the space-
craft and the test facility for the solar simulation test. The second part
is the failure of the spacecraft positioner in the space environment sim-
ulator. While the positionei was being repaired, there was some dis-
assemf,iy and reassembly of the spacecraft and some functional checkout.
The third part is the solar simulation test.
13. Due to a problem in the encoder that was thought to be vacuum caused,
two short vacuum tests were run between December 21, 1970 and
January 8, 1971.
14. A short thermal-vacuum test was performed at protoflight levels be-
tween January 11, 1970 and January 14, 1970.
15. This screen is another reintegration period between January 18, 1971
and January 27, 1971. Another mass properties measurement was also
done during this time.
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16. A vibration test was run between January 28, 1971 and February 1,
1971.
17. This screen includes the final magnetic measurements, sun spin test,
shipment to ETR, and check=out at ETR. It covers the period from
February 3, 1971 to February 15, 1971.
Performance of the System Test Screens
Figure 19 presents the performance of each system test screen in failure
flow format. As can be seen in Figure 19, a number of screens did not detect
any defects. The reason for this is that most of the defects were not eligible
for these screens. The screens with no detections have been included to pre-
serve continuity of the test program. They have not been combined with other
screens so that they would not confuse the screening activity of the other screens.
The remaining paragraphs of this section will not analyse every screen, as
was done in the subsystem test screen section, but will concentrate on the more
important screens.
Reasons for Escape from System Test Screens
The reasons for escape from eleven system test screens are presented in
'fable 14. The escapes attributed to some inadequacy range from seven percent
in system thermal-vacuum test to 35 percent in system temperature. With the
exception of the thermal-vacuum test, those screens that entail a thorc:zgh func-
tional test such as the reintegration screens, have the largest percent.,gcs in
the inadequate category. These same screens, including thermal-vacuum, also
have the highest detection percentages.
The comparison of similar screens at the system level and the subsystem
level is of some interest. The system EMI test had 25 percent of its escapes
due to inadequacy, and the subystems E1%II test had only 12 percent. The sys-
tem vibration test had 17 percent escapes due to inadequacy, and the subsystem
test had 16 percent. There were seven percent inadequate escapes for the sys-
te,n thermal-vacuum test, but 27 percent for the subsystem thermal-vacuum
test.
There does not seem to be any correlation between reasons for escape
from these particular system screens and the corresponding subsystem screens.
However, Figure 20 presents the surnmary of the reasons for escape from the
system test screens. Comparing this with Figure 12, the reasons for escape
from subsystem screens and from the system screens, when all the screens are
28
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Table 14
Reasons for Escape from Eleven System Test Screens
Ineligible	 i Inadequate I	 Diverted
Integration 5u o	 { 2a o	 2i o
EMI 71	 ' 25	 4i
Temperature i	 55 35
Reintegration
I	 -
60 22
I
1°
.: u	 CLL.V LIJl QI.1 Vi1 ,^I V I	 ,7'-	
a-
I	 5
Spin Deployment 77 14 I	 9
Reintegration/EMI 66 I
—
9
Thermal-Vacuum 4.1 7I I	 52
i	 nlar Rimhlatin" i	 ?^ 1, :l 7
Final Vibration 83 17 i	 u
h'inR1 ETH 0
considered, are distributed almost identic--" r An imporii;nL rl.,A ' here is that
49% of all the defects detected in the system test screens re^;aired the system
level for detection.
Table 15 gives the screen effectiveness for the screens ir. Tabic 14, The
effectiveness stays betiveen 13 percent and 44 percent until the thermal-vacuum
screen is reached, where the effectiveness jumps to 8a „oreent., DPSnite the
low effectiveness for some of the screens, Lhe overall system test screen effec-
tiveness is 92 percent. This is considerably higher than the 50 percent subsys-
tem screen effectiveness.
Criticality of Defects Detected in. System Test Screens
The criticality to the subsystem, before protection, of the defects found in
the system test is presented i n 'Tab'.-c A. Some 4- r^rcem of We cieiects are in
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Fia!+re 20 Summary of Diversions and Reasons for Escape fromv	
System lesi Jcfeells
the major degrading or catastrophic categories. Forty percent of the defects
detected by the subsystem screens were in these categories, so that the u-riti-
cality of defects found in the system test screens is almost the same as the
criticality of the defects detected during subsystem test. One fact that needs
to be noticed here is the large number of catastrophic and major degrading de-
fects that iclve r.:iC:apCU as far downstream as the thermai-vacuum Lest.
Ta. hia 17 shows the mission criticality of defects detected during system
test. There arc relatively few mission catastrophic or major degrading defects,
and these are caugnt early in bile system test screens.
The effects of protection on subsystem criticality are illustrated by the
rn_^rix in Table 18. The rows give the criticality before protection and the col-
umns give the criticality after protection. The numbers along the diagonal in-
dicate those defects that were not affected by protection; the numbers above the
diagonal i.ndieate the de:..cts ::hose criticality was reduced by protection; and
the numbers below the diagonal indicate the defects whose criticality was in-
creasedy protection_. An example of how criticality would be increased by
protection, would b.^ an eyn-riment that generates enough noise to affect several
other experiments, but does not affect itself. The protection for the other ex-
pC_ -rllllents is to turn! t;:.^, noi--, ^"' erimPrt off, which makes the defect catas-"
t:rophic 's As has been the case with the bench test screen and the subsystem test
32
T able 15
Screen Eifectiveness for Eleven System Test Screens
Integration I 42%
EMIi 13
Temperature 18
Reinte gration 44
V 1	
aiu
'r	 1"cti,1V11 25
Slain Deployment 3 7
Reintegration/EMI 27
Thermal-Vacuum 88
;4nlnr Rimifldtion i	 89
Final Vibration l
i
—
I	 I
I	 —Final/ETR-L
l NOTE: No defects eligible for these two
screens, therefore effectiveness is undefined.
screens, there is very little protection for the defects found in the system test
screens. Table 19 i5 a ei:nilar treatment of the effects of protection on mission
criticality. As usual, there is little effect of protection.
The last factor L-0 be considered in t".ia section is the proneness of the de-
fects detected in system test to cause a space malfunction if they were not de--
tected. The data for this consideration are presented in Table 20. As can be
seen, most of the more eriiic•al delec.l.J cuald have c used a space malfunction
if they had not been detected in test.
Crit- nllitt+ rcrsus the cNrctemµfic Ainfiurc of Defects.
r
The distribution between systematic and non-systematic defects is shown
in Figure 21. There are nearly equal numbers of each, which is different from
the subsystem screens where there were more non-systematic deieots. The
Bench 'test Screen results were midway between the subs,stem and system
result-Q.
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Table 16
Subsystem Criticality (Before Protection) of Defects Found in
System Test Screens (Numbers in table are numbers of defects)
Integration 6 2 2 4
EMT 0 1 0 1
Temperature 2 0 1 1
Reintegration 0 3 0 5
Vibration 0 i 1 0
Spin Deployment 1 0 0 2
Reintegration/EMI 1 1 i 0
Thermal-Vacuum 3 3 j	 ? 7
Solar Simulation 0 1 3 i	 4
1 2 I	 3 4
Criticality
Table 17
Mission Criticality (Before Protection) of Defects Found in
System Test Screens (Numbers in table are number of defects)
j	 integration 3 1 i
i
10
2EMI
Temperature 1 3
Reintegration !	 n	 I
Vibration
Spin Deplovnient 1
j
2
Reintegration/EMI `	 3
15	 jThermal-Vacuum
r— Sol r S?m111atinn --- ( o
1 2 3 4
Criticality
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Table 18
Effects of Protection on Subsystem Criticality
(Numbers in table are numbers of defects)
1
W 2
O
w
W 3
Co.
4
11 2
9 2 1
9
2 22
1	 2	 3	 4
AFTER
Table 19
Effects of Protection on Mission Criticality
(Numbers in table 3.re numb:^rs 3f defects)
1	 4	 1^
g	 2	 I 1O
W
W 3
4	 I	 53
1	 2	 3	 4
AFTER
iue S StLI rnatic &Lfe^cts detected in system test scrc'ns were equally divided
between ma.)i3L' ti@brauli?g and iliicvi' ucgaaui3"ig Gr^	 aac ouuOyol.cui tG3t
screens had almost twice as many systematic defects of mine • degrading criti-
cality as major degrading criticality.. The bench test screen was the sar_ne as
the system test screen in that the systematic defects were uniformly distributed
over criti. n ikrr.
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iTable 20
Probability of Flight Malfunction vs Criticality of the Malfunctions
Found in the System Test Screens (Numbers in table are number of defects)
1
-^ 2
U
3
U
a
0-20	 20-00	 80-iU0
Probability ( V) of a Flight T ah" action
100
S - SYSTEN",ATIC
80	 N-	 S I j l EIS"",,TIC
60,U
V
w 40
CL
20
0
Figure 21	 Distribution of Systct-natlt and
I Von-Systeriiutic Defeec._ Fni;r.J
in the System Test Screens
The screen effectiveness for ssystrmatie defects for nine s ystem screens is
given in Table 21. Thermal-vacuum has a sysLematic defect effectiveness equal
to Lae subsystem Lherinal-vacuum test, ':w ;,; ate...::bratfc n. test is not as effec-
tive as subsystem vibration. The overall system screen effectiveness for sys-
tematic defects is 89 percent, which is considerably better than the subsystem
screen. Since the effectiveness of the system screens for any kind of defect is
92 percent, the screen effectiveness for systematic and ::o!,-4vstematic defects
im about the 3arne.
Causes of Defects
The causes of the defects found in the systew screens are presented in
r Igu a 22. De.sign is the ma.,'or cau-sc, with ft-b- innti-on Fern Pi . and
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Table 21
em Test Screen Effectiveness for Systematic Defects
7	 --
Possible
	
I
to Detect
Detected &
Diverted Effectiveness
I
Integration
i
19 8 42%
EMI 8 0 0%
I
Temperature 16 I	 3 i	 19`70
38%Reintegration 13 5
Vibration 6 -
I	 1
337,0
Spin Deployment 5 20%
Reintegration/EMI 7 i	 2 290
Thermal-Vacuum 8
I
i
	Solar Simulation
__
3	 ; I	 57%n
parts/material third. These results are almost identical to the bench test
screen results, but are quire different from the subsystem screen results
(Figure 14). The large percentage of design defects could be a result of the
protoflight concept.
;nr-_ronmental Sensitivity of Defects
Figure 2 -3 gives the percentage of the defects found in an environmental
screen that were sensitive to that environment. Nate Ll at only 40 percent of the
defects found in thermal-vacuum were precipitated by the thermal-vacuum en-
vironment. All of the defects four-id in the solar sirs=ulat
	
acre°n were found
before the test actually began, so none were susceY;.ii;la: 	 'Lau environment.
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1SPACE PERFORMANCE
Description of Malfunctions in Space
There were seven malfunctions in space that were used for this failure flow
analysis.
1. Following the boom deployment sequence, the -Y axis ACS boom was
indicated as not being locked. Since the spacecraft was successfully
despun, the micro-switch used to indicate lock is the prime suspect.
2. Eight days after turn-on, the main telescope of the University of Chicago
experiment failed causing a major loss of data. An open circuit in a
painted stripe connection to the detector is the prime suspect.
3. The spacecraft does not respond as planned to the attitude control sys-
tem. Since the ACS is working properly, this is either a dynamics
proDlem or a computational problem, rather than a failure.
4. The -X antenna motor failed after the antenna had been extended to Ifs
feet out of a planned 120 feet. These motors had been a problem during
the entire program.
5. Dr. iVlacDonald's Very iow Energy Detector was damaged by radiation
and was turned off.
6. Dr. Erikson's Impedance Probe failed after its objec.:ives had been
achieved. A stuck relay is suspected.
7. Dr. Ogilvie's experiment is inoperative. A high voltage problem due to
outgassing of a void in potting	 suspected.
In addition to these seven malfunctions there are four anomalies that have
not been used because there is not enough information or because the anomaly is
no real problem.
1. The on-board computer had soine cases of "lapse of memory. " It is a
hardware problem, but it can be overcome with a software change.
There was not enough information to do the failure flow .^.-e.lysis of this
problem.
2. There were a few cases of the right command be. ,. L ani, 'jut the wrong
action taking pace. This has not been a recurring prcbi.em, and there
is no explaLiation as to why it ever occurred.
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I3. Dr. Cline's experiment was planned I,,-.  he turned off and on as the space-
craft entered and exited the radiation belt. During the twelfth orbit it
failed to fespond to an ON command, but about a month later it did res-
pond. No cause is known, but the :,xperiment will be left on to avoid the
problem.
4. One of the solar panels was suspected to be inoperative, but this was
later found to have been the result of a shadow.
Discussion of the Space Malfunctions
Of the seven malfunctions, one was a likely candidate for detection during
test, one was a problem through the whole program, two can almost be classi-
fied as random failures, two could not have been detected in test and cne prob-
ably could not h.-ve been detected in test.
1. The University of Chicago experiment that failed was not in the space-
craft for either thermal-vacuum or solar simulation. An identical ex-
periment failed after solar simulation, for a different reason, and was
replaced by the experiment that ultimately failed in space.
2. The antenna motors had problems throughout the whole program, some
of which were similar to the space failure. These were usually wear
problems, so the flight motors were exercised as little as possible dur-
ing test.
3. The ACS boom micro-switch failure could have been a random failure,
or it could have been damaged.
4. There are a number of relays used to step Dr. Erikson's experiment
through a series of measurements. All of the relays up to the failed
relay are still operative, so a random failure seems more likely than
wear out.
5. The dynamics problem could not have been detected in test.
G. The damage to the Very Low Energy Detector could not have been de-
tected in test, since it was an unusual environment that caused the failure.
7. The time tc outgas the suspected void in Dr. Ogilvie's experiment was
longer (800 hrs. vs. 312 hrs.) than any thermal-vacuum test and prob-
ably could not have been detected in test.
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Eighty-six p ercent of the defects were catastrophic to subsystems before
protection; 14 percent were negligible. Seventy-one percent were catastrophic
after protection. Fourteen percent were major degrading to the mission before
protection, but none were more than negligible after protection. (If the three
problems for which there are no explanations are included, then 60 percent of
the defects were catastrophic to subsystems before protection, and 50% were
still catastrophic after protection. )
Forty-three percent of the defects that caused malfunctions in space were
systematic defects. Design is the major cause of defects, with parts/materials
a close second.
Twenty- rune percent of the defects appear to be sensitive to the space
environment.
SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION
This section consists of two parts. The first part summarizes the data
gathered by using failure flow analysis. The second part interprets the data in
a . ay that an evaluation of the test program is produced.
Summary of Data
The entire screen system from bench test to space is presented in failure
flow format in Figure 24. This first part presents the significant data from
each of the four data sections of the report - bench test screen, subsystem te,3t
screen, system test screens, and space performance.
1. Bench Test Screen
• Ineligibility f r detection is the major reason for escape
• The screen was 50`c effective, but this is somewhat uncertain
• Two-thirds of the defects detected were catastrophic to subsystems
before protection
• One-eighth of the defects detected were at least major degrading to
the mission before protection
• Protection did little to change criticality
I
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Figure 2 1 C. 1 AP-I Screen Performance in Failure Flow Forman (4_ontinued)
a Eighty-five percent of the defects would have caused a malfunction in
-pace
• Systematic defects were evenly distributed in criticality
• Design was the major cause of defects
• The percentage of parts/materials defects seemed high
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2. Subsystem Test Screen
• Ineligibility is the major reason for escape
• The screen was 46 percent effective
• I here were more minor criticality to subsystem before protection
defects than major
• Protection had little effect on criticality
• The major criticality defects had a high probability of causing a
space malfunction
• Systematic defects were evenly distributed in criticality	 is
• Fabrication/assembly was the major cause
• The percentage of parts/materials eauoed defects was higher than in
bench test
• Most of the defects detected in vibration were sensitive to the vibra-
tion environment
• Less than half of the defects detected in thermal-vacuum were sensi-
tive to the thermal-vacuum environment
3. System Test Screen
• Screens with the most comprehensive functional checkout had the
highest percentage of escapes due to inadequacy, but also had the
highest dFtection rate
• Ineligibility is the major reason for escape
e The screen v.,as 92 percent effective
• Fort•/-two percent of the defects were at least major degrading to
subsystems before protection
• There were very few mission critical defects detected during system
test
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• Protection had little effect on criticality
• Most of the defects had a high probability of causing a space
malfunction
• Systematic defects were evenly distributed in criticality
• Design was the major cause of defects; fabrication/assembly was
the second most prevalent cause; parts/materials was third
• All of the defects detected in vibration were sensitive to the vibration
environment, but only forty percent of the defects detact ,^d in thermal-
vacuum were sensitive to thermal-vacuum
4. Space
There were seven malfunctions in space
• Ineligibility was the major reason for escape to space
• Sixty percent were catastrophic to subsystems before protection
• Fifty percent were catastrophic after protection
• Design was the major cause; parts/materials was second
Interpretatiun of the Data
This second part interprets the data presented in the first part, indicates
some cautions and improvements with respect to a test program, and shows
some of the useful features of failure flow analysis.
• Ineligibility is consistently the major reason for escape on a screen
by screen basis. Considering each of the screen systems - bench;
subsystem, and system - separately, this is reasonable. Most of the
screens are desig^cd :3 .detect ,part1,?.uJn.r kinds of defects. A defect
is ineligible for detection if it is a different kind of defect from the
kind for which the screen was designed.
• However, those defects that escape into space because of ineligibility
for detection present an opportunity to improve the screen system.
Those defects that were i neligible because there was no screen for
that defect, or because they did not pass through the screen, indicate
the need for a specific screen. In the case of IMP-I, a second long
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Ithernial-vacuum test, rather than the short thermal-vacuum test,
may have detected some of the defects that escaped to space.
• The overall screen was 94 percent effective. If the system test
screen effectiveness is constant, there it presents a way to assess
the risk involved in eliminating or curtailing the subsystem test
program.
• The percentage of defects that vvere catastrophic or major degrading
to subsystems, before protection, in space was somewhat higher
than it had been during test screens, 60 percent versus 46 percent.
If the 46 percent had been used to predict the percent of the space
malfunctions that would be at least major degrading, 60 percent would
have been a fairly close result.
• The effect of protection could have been very accurately predicted,
since only one of the major degrading defects in space has its criti-
cality reduced 'by protection.
• The percentage of systematic defects in space, 43 percent, is not for
from the 53 percent detected in system test. In fact, if the 37 per-
cent systematic detects detected in subsystem test is also considered,
43 percent is close to the average of subsystem and system screens.
• The distribution of cause of defects in space is quite interesting. The
major cause of defects detected in system screens was design, with
fabrication second. The major cause of defects detected in subsystem
screens was fabrication, with design second. Parts/Materials was
the third most prevalent cause for both system and subsystem detee -
tions. The fact that design accounts for three of the seven space
malfunctions is not surprising. What is somewhat surprising at first
is that parts failures accounted for two of the seven space malfunc-
tions. The concern expressed -arlier in this report, that 15 to 25
percent defects caused by parts/materials was a high percentage, is
justified by this result. This does not determine what a good percen-
tage is ; only that 15 to 25 percent is iugh. The low fraction of space
malfunctions due to fabrication defects, one out of seven, is not in
accord with the results during test. However, this could indicate
that the protoflight test program has the capability to remove almost
all of the fabrication defects from the flow. This particular question,_
whether defects were detected because of the protoflight levels, was
asked during the analysis, but the question is almost impossible to
answer on a defect by defect basis. In the case of IMP-I, though,
there were very few fabrication defect-caused malfunctions in space,
and this could be a result of the protoflight levels.
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• One space malfunction, the University of Chicago experiment, could
have been damaged during launch, and then degraded by the spare
thermal-vacuum environment until it failed. The effect of the launch
environment is a weak conjecture though. Dr. t*ilvie's experiment's
failure can be attributed tu the space vacuum, if the analysis of the
failure is correct. This means that 30 percent of the space malfunc-
tions were possibly caused by the thermal-vacuum environment. How-
evvr, one of the defects never underwent system test, and it is doubt-
ful that the other should have been detected. These data indicate that
all tiie environmentally sensitive defects that could have been found
during test were iuund. Had there been a second long thermal-vacuum
test, the two environmentally sensitive space malfunctions might pos-
sibly have been found.
There is some information developed in this report which can only be devel-
oped ly failure flow analysis, and some information that could be developed by
other means but is integrated into a unified picture by failure flow analysis.
• Failure flow analysis showed what kinds of defects were removed at
any point in the test program. it sh;,wcd that a number of maior de-
grading defects that should have been detected earlier were detected
far downstream in system thermal-vacuum test. If each screen has
a characteristic effectiveness, which is an assumption at this point,
then loading a downstream screen increases the probability of an
escape, and consequently a space malfunctior_.
• Failure flow analysis shows that not only does the system thermal-
vacuum screen detect the most defects, but it is also the most effec -
tive screen. This means that the system thermal-vacuum screen
detects a higher percentage of the defects eligible for detection than
any other screen.
This study has confirmed the need for very thorough parts screening
for protoflight programs.
• The area of test that could be improved to decrease the downstream
loading by at least 60 percent is the functional test. Only 40 percent
of the detects needed thermal-vacuuir for detection, and none needed
solar simulation.
In light of future programs that will have extensive subsystem tests before
system test, or programs that will be limited to less than full system tests be-
cause of size, failure flow anal ysis has provided some vaulable information.
•
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:'hc 3ubs3, 9+ t-m test prograrn Ps rwrformed for i1QP-4 was only 50 per-
cent effective for eligible defects, and this does not include defects
that required the system level for detection. This must be improved
before the subsystem test screens alone can be used to assure reliable
spacecraft.
• Considering the environmental sensitivity of defects detected in sub-
system screens, failure flow analysis indicates that the most improve-
ment can be made in the areas of functional tests and parts screening.
• Coupled with the low effectiveness of the subsy st,-x cost screen is the
fact that nearly 50 .x , of the defects detected during system test required
the system level of assembly for detection. Before any project is
started that would involve a spacecraft too large for system test, two
tWrbe must be changed. First, the subsystem test program must be
made more effective. Second, the number of defects that require the
system level for detection must i-, reduced.
Failure flow analysis would have the most value if it were used on a real
time basis It gives a view of how many and what Kinds of problems are occur-
ring, and thus could lead to early elimination of some sources of defects. Fail-
ure flow analysis could give an estimate of flight readiness, and indicate what
actions might achieve flight readiness in the most efficient way.
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